The Constitutional Convention of 1965

In 1950 a Commission on State Government Organization was directed by the General Assembly to work out a new constitution for Connecticut. Its report was a long discussion of constitutional considerations and a draft constitution. Nothing came of it but it is interesting material. See George D. Braden and Fred V. Cahill, Jr., "A New Constitution for Connecticut" Connecticut Bar Journal 24(1950) in two parts, pp. 121-90 and 265-323.

As indicated by previous entries, the main target of constitutional reform in Connecticut was the rotten borough system, which was as bad as any other in the nation. Things were no better in the middle of the twentieth century than they had been in the late nineteenth. W. Duane Lockard points out that in the 1950s, 4.5 percent of the population elected 32.5 percent of the representatives. See his "Constitutional Revision in Connecticut Notes on a Stumbling Block and a Proposal" Connecticut Bar Journal 27(June, 1953)2:163-69.

Lockard echoes earlier comments by John H. Riege in "Representation in the General Assembly: Some Aspects of the Present System" Connecticut Bar Journal 22(June, 1948). On the eve of Butterworth v. Dempsey, the League of Independent Voters published a fifty-two-page work, The Problem of Representation: A Review of Connecticut’s General Assembly 1683-1963, by James Valenti and Richard Galiette (New Haven, 1963). Valenti had instituted the redistricting case, Valenti v. Dempsey 211 F. Supp. 911 (D. Conn., 1962), and as recently as 1981 was still urging reason instead of politics as a basis for drawing new electoral lines. (Connecticut 44 November, 1981 11:8-10, 24) A synopsis of the Connecticut cases can be found in Robert B. McKay, Reapportionment: The Law and Politics of Equal Representation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965). That the situation had long been a scandal of national proportions is noted by Lane W. Lancaster in "Rotten Boroughs and the Connecticut Legislature," National Municipal Review 13(1942).

Aside from the legal materials, in particular the state's briefs, the most notable tract on the side of the status quo is John Howland Snow's Reapportionment: The Connecticut Resolves, A Reply to the Mandates of the Courts (New Canaan: The Long House, 1964). This work puts forth the position that equal representation by towns is the system mandated by all the fundamental documents of Connecticut government since 1639 and that the state at no time surrendered authority to the U.S. judiciary to mandate such a change. He cites long lists of judicial precedent for his position, Snow created enough of a stir to persuade a couple of legislators to put his Resolves before the General Assembly, but to no effect. The opinion in Baker v. Carr had been handed down two years earlier, and the writing on the wall was of luminous clarity.

Constitutional reform was finally mandated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Butterworth v. Dempsey 378 U.S. 564(1964). That case is discussed rather fully in Connecticut Bar Journal 38(March, 1964) 1:92-138, which includes the opinion of the Court, a concurring opinion, and an unpublished opinion of Justice Charles Clark who died during the proceedings. The case forced a constitutional convention, which in 1965 wrote a new document to replace that of 1818. But malapportionment goes deeper than the state government, a fact that is discussed in Lester B. Snyder and Richard N. Pearson "Effect of Malapportionment Cases on political Subdivisions of the State," Connecticut Bar Journal 38(March, 1965)1:1-32. Further relevant considerations are aired in Henry S. Cohn's "The Constitution's Impact on Connecticut Election Law," Connecticut Bar Journal 51(September, 1977)3:214-38. This article though emphasizing the period since Baker v. Carr(1962), which precipitated Butterworth v. Dempsey, includes much historical background after 1818. For an overall theoretical approach, see William P. Aspell "Natural Law in the Connecticut Tradition" Connecticut Bar Journal 31(June, 1957)2:105-12, in which the author defines the concept of natural law as the idea that law has its origin in absolute standards of right and wrong. The author feels that natural law shows its influence in the Fundamental Orders and subsequent basic documents.